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Extradition and the Political Offense Exception
in the Suppression of Terrorism
ANTrE C. PETERSEN*
INTRODUCTION
Combatting terrorism effectively within the confines of a democratic order
has become one of the most urgent tasks for western governments. In
Europe, violent terrorist incidents have been part of political reality for
more than two decades. Americans have been relatively protected from
attacks in their cities, yet now, more than ever, United States citizens face
the possibility that terrorism will strike them at home as well as away from
home.' In spite of the rarity of terrorist attacks on United States soil so
far, however, the United States has for years actively pursued cooperation
with western nations in attempting to suppress worldwide terrorism through
nonviolent, legal means.
Extradition treaties play a particularly important role in the cooperative
efforts to combat terrorism. Yet their effectiveness has been hampered by
the fact that the political offense exception, contained in all extradition
treaties, protects from extradition political offenders of all types, nonviolent
and violent alike, including terrorists. In response to this dilemma, the
United States and the United Kingdom recently signed a Supplementary
Treaty exempting a number of violent crimes from the protection of the
political offense exception. 2
This treaty has been severely criticized for effectively abolishing the
political offense exception and, with it, the values it embodies, such as
protecting the right to political self-determination. The dilemma created is
that between the proven effectiveness of extradition treaties in the suppres-
sion of terrorism and the desire to protect the venerable principle of the
political offense exception.
In the following Part, this Note will sketch the general background to
the role of extradition treaties in the suppression of terrorism. In Part II,
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; M.A., 1983,
Ph.D., 1985, Stanford University. I would like to thank Professors Mary Ellen O'Connell and
Craig Bradley, and Ralph Gaebler, Esq., for their helpful comments.
I. In the past, political terrorism has only rarely occurred in the United States as vigilantism
of the form practiced by the Ku Klux Klan. H. Varr & G. PERISTEIN, PERSPECTIVES ON
TERR ORiSM 42 (1991). See also Address by Judge William Sessions, Director, FBI, B'Nai B'Rith
Anti-Defamation League National Leadership Conference (March 25, 1991) (LEXIS, Nexis
library, Omni file) (discussing FBI jurisdiction and procedures for combatting terrorism).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
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this Note will address the future role of the political offense exception in
light of the need to find effective, legal, nonviolent means to combat
terrorism. This Note will analyze various proposals to retain the political
offense exception in one form or another while establishing safeguards
outside of extradition treaties to ensure efficient prosecution of terrorists,
such as an International Court of Terrorism or an International Criminal
Code.
The final section of Part II will present a proposal to delete the political
offense exception entirely. The proposal incorporates safeguards already
inherent in extradition treaties, such as clauses that prohibit extradition in
circumstances under which extradition would be inhumane or discriminatory.
However, distilling the right to a fair trial and respect for other basic
human rights in the requesting country as the most vital and surviving value
of the original political offense exception, this Note will propose that all
extradition treaties be evaluated on the basis of standards similar to those
represented by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International.
This should be done under the aegis of the executive branch, whose resources
in evaluating conditions in other states are incomparably greater than those
of the judiciary.
I. Tim ROLE OF ExTRADITION TREATIES IN COMBATTING TERRoRIsM
Cooperation among states in an attempt to curb terrorism has moved to
center stage in the foreign policy of many western nations. In the last
twenty years, myriad extremist terrorist movements have developed in Eu-
rope and the Arab world. While each terrorist group and splinter group
has its own, usually limited and geopolitically determined goals, 3 terrorist
attacks resemble one another in structure: they are carefully orchestrated
attacks on government buildings or on persons involved in government
matters, but they may also be directed at wreaking havoc in public areas
where victims are predominantly civilians who are detached completely from
government functions. 4 The operations are clandestine in that they are
mostly unannounced and often unattributable. It is not unusual for several
terrorist groups to claim responsibility after an attack; ultimately, it may
3. Intelligence services in Germany, for example, assume that Germany's Red Army
Faction (Rote Armee Fraktion) works closely with similar factions in France (Action Directe)
and Italy (Red Brigade). Their cooperation, interestingly, is not motivated to achieve some
common goal within Europe, but rather to assist each other in committing local attacks to
achieve national change. Likewise, there was considerable cooperation in the 1960s between
the precursor of the Red Army Faction, the Baader-Meinhof Group, and Palestinian groups,
such as the Abu Nidal group which trained members of the Baader-Meinhof group. DER
BAADER-MEINHOF REPORT 41-43 (1972).
4. The attacks in the Rome and Vienna airports on December 27, 1985 exemplify this
kind of attack. See Airport Terrorists Kill 13 and Wound 113 at Israeli Counters in Rome
and Vienna, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
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never be possible to determine which group-or faction of a group-is
responsible. A central tenet of terrorism, therefore, is that accurate attri-
bution of a particular attack lies predominantly in the hands of the aggres-
sors. The range of political goals pursued by terrorists and the equally
broad range of both violent and nonviolent means used in terrorist attacks
has made it virtually impossible to state with certainty what characterizes
terrorism per se or how it can be defined.5 If anything can be stated with
any certainty about terrorism, however, it is that terror-violence represents
a twofold problem: in pursuing political change, terrorism aims at nontra-
ditional targets (civilians) and it evades open conflict.
A. Combatting Terrorism Through Treaties
The particular nature of terrorist operations requires that policy makers
seek imaginative solutions to the problem. Combatting terrorism means
facing even more problems than those associated with terrorism's particularly
violent and clandestine nature. Because terrorist fighting is not "traditional"
armed conflict and because terrorist action is often directed at destroying
the fundamental order of a nation, states defending against terrorism need
to focus on appropriate methods to eradicate it.6 This usually means-or
should mean-that states refrain from taking measures that equal in rep-
rehensibility those used by the terrorists themselves. This moral imperative
is closely linked to the nature of terrorism: because terrorism is aimed at
5. The magnitude of the problem of defining terrorism is illustrated by Ambassador
Fields' statements before the Judiciary Committee:
[I]f you can define terrorism, you ought to win the Nobel Prize, because we
have been grappling with this definition for the last dozen years, to my certain
knowledge. I would think it would be extremely difficult to find a definition of
terrorism that even the United States and Great Britain could agree to.
The problem with terrorism is that the clich6 ... about one man's heroism
being another man's terrorism, is operative throughout this entire subject.
Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 164 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings]; see
also H. VnrrER & G. PELsTEN, supra note 1, at 3:
It has almost become pro forma for writers on terrorism to begin by pointing
out how hard it is to define the term terrorism. One author (Schmid, 1983)
collected more than one hundred definitions of terrorism provided by writers
between 1936 and 1983, and there is every reason to believe the number has
increased since the year of Schmid's publication.
6. See M.C. BAssIouNm, INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW: PROCEDURE xiii (1986):
As [international] crimes increase more efforts will be needed in such areas as:
codification of international and transnational crimes, international cooperation
in procedural aspects (as one of the means of enforcement), and the eventual
establishment of international machinery and of an international criminal juris-
diction to directly enforce certain types of violations and to protect and preserve
fundamental rights against all forms of threat and violations from whatever
source, be it public or private.
1992]
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destroying democratic orders,7 "the methods utilized by democratic societies
to combat terrorism must also be legal in both their substance and proce-
dure."8
Nations responding to the threat of terrorism seem indeed to have decided
that their reactions must consist of largely nonviolent means. Efforts have
centered on resolutions, conventions, and, in general, treaties, through both
bilateral and multilateral channels. In the latter context, such umbrella
groups as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States
(OAS), and the European Community (EC), all of them uniting a great
number of states, have played a particularly important role. Early treaties
in these alliances centered on the most frequent kinds of terrorist crimes,
such as hijacking of aircraft and attacks on civilians.9 Together with other
efforts, such as the regular resolutions on terrorism passed by the seven
Economic Summit nations, these agreements document the world's willing-
ness to take care of the terrorist problem through peaceful means and to
7. Friedlander calls the relationship between terrorism and democracy "symbiotic." 5 R.
FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: Docum:ENTs OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL vii (1990).
8. Id. See also statements by the seven Economic Summit nations (the United States,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, France, and Great Britain): "[We] [c]ommit ourselves to
support the rule of law in bringing terrorists to justice." Venice Statements on East-West
Relations, Terrorism and Persian Gulf, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1987, at A10, col. 1, reprinted
in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF MAJOR LAWS, TRATsEs, AOREEM NSrS, AND
Exzcunvw DocumNrrs 207 (1987) [hereinafter ComPinATioN] (report prepared for the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs). But compare this statement to the one issued by the same group
only a year earlier (the year of the United States' raid on Libya): "[Terrorism] must be fought
relentlessly and without compromise." Tokyo Statement on International Terrorism (May 5,
1986), reprinted in id. at 206.
9. See, for example, treaties on the protection of civil aviation: Convention on Offenses
and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S.
No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (signed at Tokyo; entered into force Dec. 4, 1969); Convention
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (signed at Montreal; entered into force Jan. 26,
1973); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, S. TREATY Doe. No. 19, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988) (signed at
Montreal, Feb. 24, 1988; not yet in force); and Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (signed at
The Hague; entered into force Oct. 14, 1971). And see treaties specifically designed to protect
civilians and internationally protected persons: The OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion That
Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No. 8413 (signed at
Washington; entered into force Oct. 16, 1973; for the United States Oct. 20, 1976); Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, 1035 U.N.T.S.
167 (signed at New York; entered into force Feb. 20, 1977); International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, S. ExEc. Doe. N, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979) (signed at New York,
Dec. 17, 1979; entered into force June 3, 1983; for the United States Jan. 6, 1985), reprinted
in 2 ExTEADITIoN LAWS AND TiREATIs: UNITED STATEs 965.1-965.2 (I. Kavass & A. Sprudzs
eds. 1980) (in two regularly updated volumes) [hereinafter EXTRADITiON LAws]. Other treaties,
to which the United States is not a party, include the European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90 (signed at Strasbourg).
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strengthen cooperation among states through treaties. Nations rejecting
terrorism as a means of political change seem to agree that the "war against
terrorism" should not be a war at all. The appropriate way to cope with
the threat, then, seems to be through peaceful means such as cooperation
and diplomacy between victim states.' 0
B. Facilitating Cooperation Through Extradition Treaties
Extradition treaties are based on the principle of mutuality: With every
offender extradited to a requesting state, the requested state's chances grow
that when the roles are reversed one hand will wash the other. A desirable
"by-product" of extraditing offenders is that doing so reduces international
tensions; the requested state acknowledges the high stake the requesting
state has in prosecuting an offender whose victims presumably live or lived
within the borders of the requesting state's territory."
Extradition treaties function significantly in the suppression of terrorism
but do not receive a great deal of publicity as antiterrorist measures. They
play a more covert role within the grand scheme of international cooperation
in combatting terrorism. Their advantages, however, seem all too obvious.
Extradition treaties signal that the contracting states accept each other's
sovereign right to prosecute offenders accused of crimes committed against
the requesting state or in its territory. Parties to extradition treaties document
loyalty to each other; such loyalty expresses itself in the refusal to grant
refuge to an alleged offender wanted by the other signatory. Extradition
treaties cannot be overestimated both as symbols and as effective measures
for cooperation among nations.
The concept of extradition has a venerable tradition in the relationship
between states. It dates back to circa 1280 b.c., to a clause -in the peace
treaty between Pharaoh Ramses II and King Hattusili III that provided for
the return of fugitive criminals.' 2 In the age of terrorism, extradition treaties
have gained new importance and vigor without essentially changing their
character. Particularly, the principle of loyalty inherent in such agreements
has worked for enhanced cooperation-it underscores the spirit of bilateral
unity against terrorist aggressors.
By extension, extradition treaties further international cooperation in
reducing the number of safe harbor states to which a terrorist can retreat
10. Generally, no actual force is used to strike terrorist targets (training sites, for example)-
with the exception of the United States' air attack on Tripoli and Bengasi, Libya, in 1986, an
attack whose legality under international law and the UN Charter is not entirely certain. See
generally, Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE
W. Rns. J. INT'L L. 177 (1987).
11. See Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders". The Political Offense Excep-
tion to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & PoL. 169, 173-74 (1984).
12. M.C. BAssIou i, INTERNATIONAL ExTRDnION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3-4 (1974).
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after an attack. As long as terrorists, by simply leaving the state with
jurisdiction over their crimes, can escape prosecution or move across borders
to cultivate connections with terrorist groups in other countries, terrorist
violence will be neither prevented nor penalized. Extradition treaties are no
flashy weapon in the fight against terrorism. They do not even attack the
problem at its roots. But on a very practical level, extradition treaties
eliminate a number of alternatives for terrorists who have completed or
aborted attacks. Based as these treaties are on the principle of "aut dedere
aut judicare,"' 3 extradition treaties assure that terrorist offenders are ac-
countable for their acts either in the country where the terrorist act occurred
or in the country that arrested them.1 4
In recent years, some changes made in treaties between the United States
and other nations have attracted a great deal of attention. To highlight
these changes, it is necessary to sketch out some provisions commonly found
in extradition treaties.
A "generic" extradition treaty s contains: a list enumerating crimes for
which both states agree to extradite offenders to each other; a clause that
determines whether a requested state will extradite its own nationals; double
criminality and prior jeopardy clauses (safeguarding the offender's right not
to be extradited if the crime alleged would not be prosecutable in the
requested state or if the offender had already been found guilty or discharged
in a proceeding for the same crime); and a so-called political offense
exception that often also includes a "political protection clause."
Together, these political clauses provide for two eventualities: first, that
an offender will not be extradited for offenses of a political character or
for offenses committed in the context of a political incident; and second,
that extradition will not be granted "if the Requested State has substantial
grounds for believing that the request for extradition has, in fact, been
13. "Either extradite or adjudicate." This principle figures prominently in multilateral
conventions on extradition.
14. This ideal scenario, of course, only works if the contracting partners follow the
provisions of and take seriously their responsibility under the treaty. Germany, when still
divided, ironically exemplified the best and the worst of all possible worlds in using extradition
for protection against terrorism: In spite of a treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the latter had knowingly served as an
asylum for and would not extradite a number of Red Army Faction terrorists wanted by the
Federal Republic during the 1980s. Within months of the political uprising in the GDR, the
de Maizi~re administration, in June of 1990, exposed and, as a substantial gesture of good
will, delivered the former Baader-Meinhof Group members to the FRG (the exchange was in
fact so rapid that not even a formal request for extradition was presented to the GDR
government). Oral communication from the Ministry of Justice, FRG, Dec. 1990.
15. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, United States-Federal Republic of Ger-
many, 32 U.S.T. 1485, T.I.A.S. No. 9785, reprinted in 1 ExTRADrriON LAws, supra note 9,
at 300.5 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty between the United States and Germany] (signed at
Bonn; entered into force Aug. 29, 1980) (subsequent page references are to EXTRADION
LAws). The United States currently is a party to some 100 extradition treaties, most of which
incorporate the elements mentioned.
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made with a view to try or punish the person sought for an offense" 1 6 of
a political character. This latter provision of the political offense exception
is often mirrored by a separate clause containing a "humanitarian excep-
tion" that holds that an offender shall not be extradited if there is reason
to believe that such "special circumstances" as his "age, health or other
personal conditions" will make extradition "incompatible with humanitarian
considerations." 1 7 Often, the humanitarian exception in a slightly different
version functions as the "equal protection clause" of the treaty, prohibiting
extradition when an offender would be put on trial or punished on account
of his "race, religion, nationality, or political opinion,"' 8 partially overlap-
ping at this point with the political protection clause. The clauses just
described have remained virtually unaltered since the first extradition treaties
were signed. Recently, however, radical changes have occurred in extradition
treaties in order to adapt them to their novel task of suppressing terrorism.
These changes are almost exclusively located in the area of the political
offense exception/political protection clause, 19 which is discussed next.
C. The Political Offense Exception
The two prongs usually found in the political offense exception2° protect
the offender from prosecution for political crimes and from prosecution for
purely political motivation in and by the requesting state. Other than
extradition treaties themselves, the exception exempting political crimes from
the agreed-upon list of extraditable offenses is of very recent origin-it is
roughly 160 years old. It came into existence not long after the French
Revolution, in the wake of which the increasing preoccupation of Europe's
citizenry with political autonomy laid the ideological groundwork for this
16. Id. at 300.10.
17. Extradition Treaty, June 22, 1972, United States-Denmark, 25 U.S.T. 1293, T.I.A.S.
7864, reprinted in 1 EXTRADmON LAWS, supra note 9, at 200.11 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Denmark]. The same provision exists in the Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Norway. Id. at 660.10.
18. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United States-United Kingdom, S.
Exac. Doc. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 2 EXTRADrrION LAWS, supra note
9, at 920.1 [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty] (subsequent page references are to EXTRADrrIoN
LAws).
19. Unless otherwise noted, I will use the term "political offense exception" to include the
"political protection clause." This parallels the actual appearance of the two provisions in
extradition treaties: often together, at times the first without the latter, and occasionally
separated (where the political protection clause appears in the context of an "equal protection
clause").
20. For an important treatise on extradition law in general and the political offense exception
in particular, see G. GItBERT, ASPECTS OF EXTPrADTON LAW (1991), especially Chapter Six
("The Political Offense Exemption"). Unfortunately, the book appeared too recently to be
incorporated adequately into this discussion.
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restriction of extradition treaties. 21 The first provision to protect political
offenders appeared in a Belgian extradition act in 183322 and has since been
incorporated into most Western extradition treaties. Since then, the political
offense exception has stood for two main principles: that the freedom of
speech of the emerging Western democracies should be acknowledged outside
of their boundaries and that an attitude of noninterference in political
struggles abroad would best serve the goals of diplomacy and international
cooperation.
United States extradition treaties before 1986 contained political offense
exceptions whose structures varied only insignificantly from treaty to treaty.
They protected offenders from extradition if the crimes of which the
offenders were accused were "regarded by the Requested State as a political
offense, an offense of a political character or as an offense connected with
such an offense." 23 This description of political crimes, as will be discussed,
leaves a broad spectrum of offenses open for interpretation as political
offenses. The field, however, broadens even more because a presumably
ordinary extraditable offense (and enumerated in the treaty as such) can
attain the status of a political crime by mere association, by being "con-
nected with such a [political] offense."2 4
The second clause found frequently within the political offense exception,
the political protection clause, is in fact an acknowledgment that an element
of mistrust may remain between treaty partners. It addresses the possibility
of political motivation behind a requesting state's demand for extradition
and attempts to safeguard against requests that are based on fictional
charges in order to try the offender for political offenses. 25
The political offense exception is itself, however, not immune to excep-
tions. The so-called clause Belge (or "clause d'attentat")26 shows just where
21. Other commentators link the political offense exception with the appearance of gov-
ernments based on constitutional power. See Littenberg, The Political Offense Exception: An
Historical Analysis and Model for the Future, 64 TuL. L. R v. 1196, 1198 (1990).
22. Groarke, Comment, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense
Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty,
136 U. PA. L. Ray. 1515, 1520 (1988); Littenberg, supra note 21, at 1197.
23. Extradition Treaty between the United States and Germany, supra note 15, art. 4, at
300.9.
24. This formulation in fact relates to the test commonly used in American courts to
determine whether an offense merits the status of political offense, the so-called "incidence
test" which this Note will discuss later. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
25. The extradition treaty between Denmark and the United States contains a "liberal"
version of this clause: "if the requested State has reason to assume that the requisition for
[the offender's] surrender has, in fact, been made with a view to try or punish him for a
political offense or an offense connected with a political offense." Extradition Treaty between
United States and Denmark, supra note 17, at 200.11 (emphasis added). The German coun-
terpart to this provision, for example, is somewhat stricter, requiring "substantial grounds for
believing" that political motivation may be behind the extradition request. Extradition Treaty
between the United States and Germany, supra note 15, at 300.10.
26. See Lubet, Extradition Unbound: A Reply to Professors Blakesley and Bassiouni, 24
Tax. INT'L L.J. 47, 58 (1989).
[Vol. 67:767
EXTRADITION AND TERRORISM
the limits of a political offense classification are: any crime committed
against the "life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of
Government of one of the Contracting Parties or of a member of his
family"27 will never qualify as a political offense. To a degree, this exception
to the exception already gravely undermines the purported raison d'etre of
the political offense exception.
One more exception to the political offense exception in many treaties,
and one of more recent origin, provides that the requested state shall not
refuse extradition in cases where the crime is one "which the Contracting
Parties or the Requesting State have the obligation to prosecute by reason
of a multi-lateral international agreement."28 Examples of such multilateral
treaties are the Geneva Conventions or, among others, any of the treaties
mentioned before that were signed to combat terrorism.29 In reality, this
exception simply codifies a concept that has existed almost as long as the
political offense exception itself: certain crimes, such as war crimes, slavery,
genocide, and air and sea piracy, will always be denied the benefits of
political offense status. 0
One of the most difficult questions connected to the political offense
exception is how to determine what crimes actually are considered to be
political offenses. Political offenses are generally divided into two kinds:
"pure" political offenses (treason, sedition, and espionage), for which a
political offense exception appears most sensible; and "relative" political
offenses. Relative political offenses are "ordinary," often violent crimes
that occur in connection with political uprisings.' In the United States,
these latter crimes are determined to be political offenses according to the
so-called "incidence test." The incidence test, established in In re Ezeta,32
weighs the circumstances in which the offense occurs. If the violence was
committed in furtherance of a political aim or uprising, protection from
the political offense exception will be granted.3 Therefore, ordinary crimes
that may actually be on the list of enumerated crimes for which extradition
shall take place can attain the status of political offenses under this test.
27. Extradition Treaty between the United States and Germany, supra note 15, at 300.10.
28. Id.
29. See supra note 9.
30. Littenberg, supra note 21, at 1200. See also M.C. BAssIoUN, The Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Law and Practice, in TEaoRISM AND PoamcAL CaMs 398, 434-43
(1975) (pointing out that the lack of codification of crimes against the Law of Nations has
hampered the practical application of this doctrine and pointing to the case of the German
emperor Wilhelm II, who had been accused, in the Versailles Treaty, of international law
violations, but who nevertheless was not extradited by the Dutch to the Allies.).
31. Banoff & Pyle, supra note 11, at 170.
32. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
33. See Kelly, Note, The Political Offense Exemption to Extradition: Protecting the Right
of Rebellion in an Era of International Political Violence, 66 OR. L. REv. 405, 411-13 (1987).
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In Ornelas v. Ruiz,14 the Court did, however, underscore that the offense
has to occur incidental to, not merely simultaneous with, a political upris-
ing. 35
While the pure political offenses are clearly defined, ample room for
interpretation is left in determining what makes a crime a relative political
offense. The phrasing of the political offense exception is broad and flexible
enough to leave room for changing attitudes toward the value or appreciation
of a political act. This flexibility, however, makes the concept susceptible
to manipulation and creates some of the problems which, as this Note will
show, suggest that the political offense exception and the inconsistent way
in which it has been applied may actually be a liability both to the
humanitarian principles it was designed to further and to the interests of
international cooperation it has come to represent.
In defining relative political offenses, decision makers should at all times
take into consideration the reasons for having a political offense exception.
Such motivations range from humanitarian and fairness concerns to foreign
policy considerations.16 One of the most frequently mentioned reasons for
not extraditing persons accused of political crimes is the fear that the
requesting state's judicial system will be incapable of treating justly those
who have shown their disregard for or distrust of their government. Re-
quested states may also fear that political offenders will be subjected to
torture and other inhumane treatment in the requesting country.
Jurisprudential explanations for the political offense exception imply that
political crimes are, after all, not real crimes at all. This latter reason,
however, should theoretically only apply to the pure political offenses of
treason, sedition, and espionage, which are generally victimless acts directed
not at persons but at the structure of government. The same explanation
does not hold true with respect to relative political offenses, because these
include such ordinary crimes as murder or assault committed in the context
of a political incident.
A final reason mentioned for the political offense exception concerns
foreign policy. The requested state preserves its neutrality toward the internal
struggle in the requesting state.17 Such reasoning suggests that political
crimes differ from ordinary crimes, that they are somehow augmented by
the political motivation underlying them. But more importantly, this reason
may also focus in a rather cynical way on the offender herself and the
possibility that the tides might turn and she could become part of a legitimate
government with which the requested state would eventually like to be able
to interact diplomatically.
34. 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
35. Id. at 511-12; see also Kelly, supra note 33, at 412.




Laudable as some of the motivations behind refusing to extradite political
offenders are, the very existence of this exception seems to undo the value
of extradition treaties in combatting terrorism. If terrorists can use the
intentionally flexible and loose definition of political offenses to avoid being
extradited, extradition treaties have lost all value in combatting terrorism.
Worse yet, they can become tools for supporting one kind of terrorism
while condemning others, depending on the political perspective of the
respective interpreter responsible for determining whether an offender shall
have the benefit of the political offense exception."
Regrettably, during the last eleven years this seems to be what has
happened in American case law on the political offense exception. In a
series of proceedings against Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists whose
extradition Great Britain had requested, the courts held that the political
offense exception protected their acts. In McMullen v. LN.S.,3 9 the court
applied the political offense exception in ruling under the incidence test that
McMullen's membership in the Provisional IRA and repeated bombing of
British barracks had to be seen in the context of a political uprising.
Political offender status was also granted in United States v. Mackin,4°
where Mackin was charged with murdering a British soldier, and in In re
Doherty,41 where Doherty had actually been convicted of murdering a British
soldier but had managed to flee to the United States. The tide seemed to
turn somewhat in Quinn v. Robinson,42 where the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court's ruling that the political offense exception prohibited an
IRA member's extradition. The Ninth Circuit held that when Quinn shot a
constable during a chase in London he was literally too far removed from
the locus of the political uprising. Nevertheless, Quinn did not deviate
radically from the general rule that IRA terrorists have a good chance of
finding a safe haven in the United States under the protection of the political
offense exception.
38. A famous remark by the historian Theodor Mommsen captures this dilemma perfectly:
"Impartiality in political trials is about on the level with the Immaculate Conception: one can
wish for it but one cannot produce it." Littenberg, supra note 21, at 1237.
39. 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Fuller, Note, Extradition of Terrorists: An
Executive Solution to the Limitations of the Political Offense Exception in the Context of
Contemporary Judicial Interpretations of American Extradition Law, 11 Sussouc TRANSNAT'L
L.J. 351, 367-71 (1987).
40. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
41. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). For a detailed discussion of Doherty's subsequent
history, see the case note Extradition-Denial of Asylum-Withholding Deportation-Different
Tactics Used by the Attorney General to Deliver Provisional Irish Republican Army Members
to the British: Doherty v. U.S., 908 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), 20 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
665 (1990). The case was subsequently granted certiorari, and, according to the Supreme
Court's decision of Jan 15, 1992, Doherty will now be extradited to the United Kingdom. INS
v. Doherty, 112 S. Ct. 719 (1992).
42. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
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In contrast, Palestinian terrorists have fared worse in American courts.
In Eain v. Wilkes, 43 Eain was denied a writ of habeas corpus and his
extradition was ordered because he could not establish a sufficient connec-
tion between his bombing of a market area in the Israeli city of Tiberias
(in which two youths were killed) and the political goals of the PLO.4 4 The
court analyzed the legitimacy of the tactics used and the motive for the act
and determined that the bombing of civilians did not constitute a political
offense.45 Likewise, in Ahmad v. Wigen,46 the petitioner, who had allegedly
firebombed and attacked a Tel Aviv bus with machine guns, was denied
the protection of the political offense exception because he failed to show
that there was an actual political uprising in the context of which he could
place his acts. 47
The difficult task for policy makers then seems to be to retain the value
of extradition treaties in combatting terrorism and dealing out justice
evenhandedly, without depriving "true" political offenders of the benefits
of the political offense exception. This task has been hampered extensively
by the fact that highly emotional responses to violent terrorist attacks have
made it seemingly easy to decide that it would be a solution to render the
political offense exception inapplicable to such acts; yet the question remains
where one should draw the line between "legitimate violence" in connection
with a political uprising (the traditional view of a relative political offense)
and the new form of late twentieth-century terrorism. In 1985, the United
States and the United Kingdom, in their mutual extradition treaty,4 at-
tempted a solution by restricting the political offense exception to nonviolent
political acts-an attempt that was met with tremendous criticism.
D. The "Supplementary Treaty" Between the United States
and the United Kingdom
The structure of political offense exceptions had remained virtually un-
changed until 1986. Then, during the Reagan administration, an essentially
local conflict triggered fundamental changes in the concept and interpreta-
tion of the political offense exception. The British government had become
increasingly worried about the escape of IRA terrorists to the United States
43. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
44. Id. at 520.
45. Id. at 518-23; see also Petkunas, The United States, Israel and Their Extradition
Dilemma, 12 MIcH. J. OF INT'L L. 204, 210-11 (1990) (pointing out that the subjective test
embodied in Eain runs the danger of legitimizing some methods of revolt while rejecting
others, thereby undermining the policy underlying the political offense exception).
46. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
47. Id. at 409 ("Sporadic acts of violence cannot justify deliberately waylaying a civilian
bus operating on a regularly scheduled run . . ").
48. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom-Northern Ireland, 28
U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468; Supplementary Treaty, supra note 18, at 920.5.
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where the IRA terrorists could count on strong support for their cause from
Irish immigrants and where the political offense exception sheltered them
from extradition. In 1986, the two countries entered into a supplementary
treaty49 that drastically changed the character and makeup of the political
offense exception.50 Article 1 categorically excepted from the list of possible
political offenses the following crimes:
(a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation
pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person
sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for decision
as to prosecution;
(b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily
harm;
(c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including
taking a hostage;
(d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm,
letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers
any person; and
(e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation
as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such
an offense.5
It is highly unlikely that McMullen, Mackin, or Doherty would have escaped
extradition under these new provisions.5 2 The rephrased exception has had
a potentially dramatic impact on the ability of terrorists to claim immunity
from extradition under a political offense exception. Article 1 targeted
means of operation frequently employed by terrorists (bombings and hi-
jackings, for example) and effectively eliminated all relative political crimes
from the political offense exception. It also reaffirmed that the requesting
state has the duty to adhere to multilateral treaties. It did not, however,
omit the humanitarian exception, which holds that extradition shall not be
granted if there is reason to believe that the requesting country is seeking
extradition on account of the "race, religion, nationality, or political opi-
nions" of the offender.5 3
II. THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
IN THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM
Critics of the Supplementary Treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom point out that depriving those who commit relative political
crimes of any protection entails more than the Supplementary Treaty may
49. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 18, at 920.20e.
50. Following the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, the United States renegotiated a number
of extradition treaties that contained the new version of the political offense exception. See,
e.g., Supplementary Treaty on Extradition, Mar. 17, 1987, United States-Belgium, reprinted
in COMPIIXrioN, supra note 8, at 313.
51. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 18, at 920.20e.
52. The provisions are "new" with the exception of article l(a), versions of which are
commonly found in extradition treaties predating the U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty.
53. The "humanitarian exception" can be found in article 3 of the Supplementary Treaty,
supra note 18, at 920.20f.
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have openly bargained for: it equals a de facto abolition of the political
offense exception. It can also be attacked for hiding behind the fagade of
practicality and justice the unresolved problem that subjectivity will always
be the key factor in determining whose political acts should be protected.
The restriction created in the Supplementary Treaty appears to be a curious
hybrid of foreign policy goals and an accepted concept of international
relations-a hybrid that ultimately accomplishes little, or nothing.
This Part will explore the tension between protecting "justifiable" political
offenses and making progress in combatting terrorism. The discussion will
first focus on problematic aspects of the restricted political offense exception
and other suggestions that have been made, such as leaving the political
offense exception intact or inventing separate means of combatting terrorism
within extradition treaties. This Note will then analyze whether the opposite
approach, namely deleting the political offense exception altogether, could
present a feasible solution.
A. The Restricted Political Offense Exception
The rewording of the political offense exception triggered a fervent debate
about the repercussions of delimiting the means allowable in political
uprisings to qualify as a political offender.14 Commentators have raised
issues such as unfairness, danger, and even unconstitutionality of restricting
political offender status to those who commit political acts through nonvi-
olent means.55 The intensity of the criticism levelled against the new and
"compromised" version of the political offense exception in the Supple-
mentary Treaty equals the outcries heard whenever the right to political
autonomy or free expression is threatened. That should not be surprising:
the political offense exception is the "First Amendment" of extradition
treaties and stands for an individual's right to be protected against harmful
consequences incurred for expressing political opinions or acting on political
beliefs.
Here, however, the similarities end. No basic constitutional right is
abolished or even curbed by restricting the political offense exception. The
reactions to the Supplementary Treaty illustrate in fact what one could call
an "overvaluation" of the principle itself and of the magnitude of the
54. See, e.g., Groarke, supra note 22; Simon, Note, The Political Offense Exception:
Recent Changes in Extradition Law Appertaining to the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1988 AsIz.
J. INT'L & Comp. L. 244 (focusing on the particular nature of Northern Ireland's Diplock
courts).
55. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1986-87); Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited:
Extradition Between the U.S. and the U.K-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among
Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 255 (1986-87). See Lubet,
supra note 26, for a reaction to such criticisms.
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changes that have affected it since 1986. In an era of increasing and ever
more violent terrorist incidents, the political offense exception itself became
a battleground on which the desire to grant the freedom to protest for
political reasons was at odds with the practical implications of granting
political offender status to terrorists who, many seemed to agree, did not
deserve such beneficial treatment. Under the earlier formulation of the
exception, terrorists and nonviolent political activists alike were declared
political offenders for fear that the exception might otherwise be abolished
altogether.
The Supplementary Treaty addressed that very tension by reformulating
the political offense exception; it attempted to retain the principle of
protected political activity for which extradition would be denied and, at
the same time, to close the loophole 6 through which terrorists had escaped
prosecution.57 But in the criticism of the Supplementary Treaty, two basic
fears converged: that the new version, a mere empty shell, was a radical
break with the fundamental concept underlying the political offense excep-
tion and that this radical reformulation indicated that soon, without regard
for the historical and ideological value of the political offender status, the
exception would be extinct.
In 1986, no other extradition treaty to which the United States was a
signatory seemed to contain a political offense exception quite like the. one
that appeared in the Supplementary Treaty with Great Britain and Northern
Ireland. The United Kingdom, however, had agreed to a similar provision
eight years earlier when it became a signatory to the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism.5 This Convention was the first major
56. Terrorism was the major (and acknowledged) reason for creating the new type of
political offense exception. The Letter of Transmittal to the U.S. Senate regarding the
Supplementary Extradition Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, states
expressly:
[The Supplementary Treaty] represents an important step in improving law
enforcement cooperation and combatting terrorism by excluding from the scope
of the political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists,
e.g., murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, use of a destructive device capable of
endangering life or causing grievous bodily harm, and attempt or conspiracy 'to
commit the foregoing offenses.
1 EXTRADITION LAws, supra note 9, at 300.67 (emphasis added).
57. While no one agrees on a precise definition of teirorism, the name given to the
phenomenon evokes its violent and victimizing character. Violent means and instilling fear
were exactly what article I of the Supplementary Treaty addressed. See, e.g., article 1(d) of
the Supplementary Treaty, supra note 18, at 920.20e ("an offense involving the use of a
bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use
endangers any person." (emphasis added)).
58. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (Convention europfene pour la
repression du terrorisme; Europhisches 0bereinkommen zur Bekmpfung des Terrorismus),
Bundesgesetzblatt (BGB), 1978, II, 322-27, reprinted in I. LACOSTE, DIE EuRor,(iscim TER-
RORISMus-KoNvENTION 201-25 (1982) [hereinafter European Convention] (includes letters of
"Reservation and Declaration" by signatories).
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group effort to deal transnationally with the problem of terrorism through
heightened cooperation among member states.s9 The member states' idea of
creating "greater unity" and combatting terrorism with "effective measures"
centered as its first goal on "suppression," not prevention, on "ensur[ing]
that the perpetrators of [terrorist] acts do not escape prosecution and
punishment."' 6 Consequently, the European Convention on the Suppression
of Terrorism became, first and foremost, a multilateral extradition treaty
based on the parties' belief that "extradition is a particularly effective
measure for achieving [prosecution and punishment]. ' 61
It is therefore no surprise that article 1 of the Convention all but
extinguishes the traditional political offense exception. While article l(a)
and (b) reiterate the multilateral treaty responsibility for all member states,
article 1(c) through (f) remove from the exception most relative political
offenses:
Article 1
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of the
following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an
offence connected with a political offence or as an offence inspired by
political motives:
(c) a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity
or liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic
agents;
(d) an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious
unlawful detention;
(e) an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic
firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
(f) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation
as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such
an offence. 2
Article 2 of the Convention expands, for signatory states, the reach of
article 1. Under article 2, signatories "may" additionally exclude from
political offenses "a serious offence involving an act of violence, other than
one covered by Article 1, against the life, physical integrity or liberty of a
person."63
When comparing the United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Treaty
to the European Convention, it becomes apparent that the former is a
59. The first extradition test case between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom
(for suspected IRA bomber Dessie Ellis) is currently being heard before the Supreme Court in
Dublin. "Terror Suspect 'Should Not Be Extradited,"' Press Assoc. Newsfile, Nov. 8, 1990
(LEXIS, Nexis library). Ellis went on a hunger strike to prevent his extradition to the United
Kingdom.
60. European Convention, supra note 58, at 322.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 322-23.
63. Id. at 323.
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mirror image of the latter with one important exception. While the Supple-
mentary Treaty categorically excepts from political offense status crimes
such as "murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous
bodily harm,"64 the European Convention omits these crimes originally from
article 1 but includes them as an exception in article 265 whose signing is
optional for the signatories of the Convention."
It is entirely in keeping with the United Kingdom's stance toward the
European Convention, however, that this optional provision was to become
an intricate and mandatory part of the Supplementary Treaty with the
United States. Article 13 of the Convention, mindful of the fact that the
political offense exception has a different status in different countries,
provides that "[a]ny state may ... declare that it reserves the right to
refuse extradition in respect of any offence mentioned in Article 1 which it
considers to be a political offence, an offence connected with a political
offence or an offence inspired by political motives." 67 The United Kingdom
elected not to register reservations under article 13 concerning the enumer-
ated offenses in article 1."
The unequivocal attitude that the terrorist-stricken United Kingdom has
shown toward limiting the political offense exception no doubt found
resonance in the Reagan administration's own stance toward the phenom-
enon. The United Kingdom could make a strong case that the United States
had to put their treaties where their rhetoric was with respect to terrorism. 69
64. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 18, at 920.20e.
65. See supra text accompanying note 63.
66. European Convention, supra note 58, at 323.
67. Id. at 326. The Convention goes on to provide that in making that decision, a state
shall judge the seriousness of the offense and take into account "(a) that it created a collective
danger to the life, physical integrity or liberty of persons; or (b) that it affected persons
foreign to the motives behind it; or (c) that cruel or vicious means have been used in the
commission of the offence." Id.
68. Seven countries, however, did: the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Iceland, Sweden,
and Norway) and Italy all reserved the right to declare any of the enumerated article 1 offenses
to be political offenses (with the exception, presumably, of those covered by multilateral
treaties) but agreed to adhere to the provisions of article 13-that is, to include in their
determination the "vicious" character of the offense and its repercussions for uninvolved
persons. European Convention, supra note 58, at 207-25. Portugal reserved the right of
determination without reference to the article 13 factors. France's declaration, the lengthiest
of all, emphasized France's commitment to the values of political self-determination embodied
in the French Constitution and its intent to "subject the application of the Convention to
certain conditions. On ratification [France] will make the reservations necessary to ensure that
... human rights will at no time be endangered." Id. at 214. Only the declarations of Cyprus,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom elected not to take advantage of
the article 13 options. Id. at 207, 210, 225. It is therefore hardly surprising that the United
States' first supplementary treaty to follow the model of the supplementary treaty with the
United Kingdom was with the Federal Republic of Germany.
69. See Letter by the British Embassy to Sen. Orrin Hatch:
We see this new Treaty as a significant, practical contribution to the fight against
international terrorism. Stable and reliable extradition arrangements have long
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But it is well worth noting that the provisions adopted in that treaty had
been created and ratified by the European Council eight years earlier
expressly to suppress terrorism.70 The Supplementary Treaty was therefore
preceded in kind by a highly acclaimed Convention whose restriction of the
political offense exception, rather than being criticized, had been applauded
because of the very context in which it appeared.
The restricted political offense exception has played a vital role in United
States antiterrorism policy. In the updated treaties that followed the Sup-
plementary Treaty, the United States emphasized, in preambles and letters
of transmittal, the close link between the new versions of the political
offense exception in supplementary treaties and the goal of suppressing
terrorism.7 ' After 1986, therefore, the administration opted to subordinate
the acknowledged values of a political offense exception per se to the
interest of fighting terrorism with procedural means.
While the link between more easily facilitated extradition and the policy
of suppressing terrorism moved openly to the forefront after the U.K.-U.S.
Supplementary Treaty, the link had actually been established a few years
earlier. The United States, of course, was not a signatory to the European
Council's Convention on the Suppression- of Terrorism, yet that Conven-
tion's provisions did not suddenly "invade" U.S. extradition law in the
Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom. In 1984, the United States
signed an extradition treaty with Italy,7 2 in which the formulation of the
been regarded by the Western democracies as an important part of our defence
against terrorists. Unfortunately in recent years terrorist fugitives from UK justice
have been able to find safe haven in the United States. . . . IThe courts accepted
that ... the offences were "political" .
Hearings, supra note 5, at 167.
70. The preamble to the Supplementary Treaty does not state expressly that the treaty was
revised to combat terrorism more effectively; the hearings before passage of the treaty, however,
amply attest to this goal. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 5, at 1, 52, 53-54 (statements of
Senators Hatch, Thurmond, and DeConcini).
71. See, for example, the preamble to the Supplementary Treaty with Belgium: "The United
States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, Concerned about the growing danger caused
by the increase of terrorist acts, Convinced that extradition is an effective means to combat
these acts, Agree to the following .... "; COMPaATION, supra note 8; Letter of Transmittal
from President Reagan to the U.S. Senate regarding the Supplementary Treaty with the Federal
Republic of Germany:
[The treaty] represents an important step in improving law enforcement cooper-
ation and combatting terrorism by excluding from the scope of the political
offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists, e.g., murder,
manslaughter, kidnapping, use of a destructive device capable of endangering life
or causing grievous bodily harm, and attempt or conspiracy to commit the
foregoing offenses.
I EXTRADITION LAWS, supra note 9, at 300.67.
72. Extradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10837, reprinted
in 2 EXTRADriON LAWS, supra note 9, at 450.1 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty with Italy]




political offense exception marked a thin line between a traditional version,
leaving room both for pure and relative political offenses, and the restricted
version that appears both in the European Convention and in the Supple-
mentary Treaty with the U.K., which was entered into force two years after
the Italian treaty.
The political offense exception (article V) in the Italian treaty includes
the two-fold provision not to extradite for political offenses and in situations
when extradition is sought for political reasons. It also includes the multi-
lateral treaty provision and a Head of State exception. Within these very
clauses, however, the first restrictions of the political offense exception at
large become apparent. The treaty provides that political offense status will
not be granted if the crime's "consequences were or could have been
grave." ' 73 Gravity, both of the act itself and of its consequences, is deter-
mined by taking into account "the fact that the offense endangered public
safety, harmed persons unrelated to the political purpose of the offender,
or was committed with ruthlessness." 74
The focus on the safety of those persons incapable of changing the
political reality to which the offender objects encompasses in a nutshell all
those crimes enumerated in both the subsequent U.K. Supplementary Treaty
and the European Convention: violent acts that, in the context of a political
uprising, might have attained relative political offense status in earlier
treaties. And in the factors it mentions for determining gravity, the Italian
Treaty traces almost verbatim the provisions of article 13 of the European
Convention: creating a danger for persons uninvolved in the political motives
behind the act and the vicious or ruthless character of its execution. Taking
into account the implications of the Italian Treaty's "exception to the
exception," one therefore cannot argue that the Supplementary Treaty
between the United States and the United Kingdom represented a radical
departure from principles held inviolate in extradition treaties until 1986. 75
If the historical context of the restricted political offense exception is
taken into consideration, it becomes clear that the new clause is far from
being a radical innovation. Not only can the criticism of unsettling American
law not be levelled against it, but it also has some distinct advantages.
Under the restricted political offense exception, only persons having allegedly
committed pure political crimes such as treason, espionage, and sedition,
73. Id. at 450.9.
74. Id.
75. A parallel in case law to this softening of the political offense exception can be found
in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). In Eain, the court
essentially created a "wanton crime" exception to the political offense exception: "The [political
offense] exception does not make a random bombing intended to result in the cold-blooded
murder of civilians incidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent a direct link




and nonviolent relative political acts are protected from extradition to the
requesting state. The undeniable advantage of the new version lies in limiting
subjective evaluation of the offender's act, in reducing the danger that the
political ideology of the decision maker will influence the outcome of the
extradition hearing, and in underwriting enhanced cooperation among nations
in prosecuting terrorists. In this way, the political offense exception becomes
as certain in the crimes to which it applies as the extradition treaty at large,
which applies to enumerated crimes agreed on by the signatory states. By
listing a variety of crimes to which the political offense exception must not
apply, the margin of error or dispute has clearly been lowered. For the
sake of combatting terrorism, an attempt has been made at defining political
crime-and defining it narrowly-an idea that seems to contradict the
concept of the political offense exception.
Yet this seems like a Pyrrhic victory. Flexibility was given up for certainty,
and protection of the individual was traded for protection of the group.
The motivations which animated the original political offense exception-
fairness toward those desiring political change or the desire to remain
neutral towards such struggles76-have all but disappeared. They now apply
to a political offense principle limited to predominantly subversive (treason,
for example) and, presumably, less effective (nonviolent only?) political
struggle.
Additional concerns have been raised about the prototype of the restricted
political offense exception in the Supplementary Treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom. Terrorists extradited by the United States
face a special court system in the United Kingdom that lacks some of the
protections a defendant could ordinarily expect to have in an American
court. Under emergency provisions enacted in reaction to the wave of
terrorism in Northern Ireland in the 1970s, so-called Diplock courts (named
after Lord Diplock, who recommended their installation) were empowered
to try offenders accused of a number of crimes typically committed by
terrorists. 77 One major aspect in which Diplock courts differ from other
courts is that they adjudicate without a jury. This seemed warranted because
empirical studies of juries in Northern Ireland had shown that there existed
both political and religious bias by juries against defendants and potential
danger of retribution to juries.78 The European Court of Human Rights has
evaluated the fairness of the Diplock court system and found that it did
not practice torture but that some techniques used amount to inhumane
76. Fuller, supra note 39, at 363.
77. See generally Groarke, supra note 22, at 1535. Crimes over which a Diplock court has
jurisdiction are, among others, murder, assault, kidnapping, and any offense involving the use
of explosives. Id. The offenses essentially equal those mentioned in the European Convention
on the Suppression of Terrorism.
78. Id. at 1536.
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and degrading treatment (such as hooding the prisoners and depriving them
of sleep).7 9
The restricted political offense exception represents an attempt at sup-
pressing terrorism by restructuring bilateral extradition treaties. The new
provision is consistent with other attempts to combat terrorism through
changed extradition concepts, such as the European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism. Its main drawback, however, lies in its character
as a halfway solution. The restricted political offense exception's acknowl-
edged goal of suppressing violent political struggle is at odds with the
original protective goals inherent in the political offense exception. As such,
the Supplementary Treaty fails to signal to terrorists that all terrorist crimes
involving violence will be treated as common crimes subject to extradition.
As a symbol, therefore, the Supplementary Treaty fails its mission while,
on the other hand, managing to remove considerable practical barriers in
prosecuting terrorists. This largely unacknowledged and unresolved tension
inherent in the restricted political offense exception suggests that other
means may be more appropriate in dealing legally with terrorists.
B. Keeping the Political Offense Exception Unchanged:
Adding Other Safeguards
In response to the Supplementary Treaty between the United States and
the United Kingdom, many critics have suggested that the political offense
exception should be left intact and that other means of separating serious
terrorist offenses from the realm of protected political activism should
instead be created.80 Such suggestions are animated by the desire to protect
the very values the political offense exception has traditionally stood for
and by the simultaneous admission that in its traditional formulation the
exclusion is susceptible to biased interpretation. In the context of United
States adjudication, one could argue that such bias emerges in the decision
to shelter IRA terrorists while extraditing members of the PLO accused of
terrorist acts. Likewise, there is, for example, great uncertainty whether the
protection of the political offense exception applies only to violent "polit-
ical" acts directed at and involving military and governmental personnel or
whether it applies to all kinds of political uprising, even those harming
civilians either intentionally or unintentionally. Without implying that those
79. Id. at 1536-37; see also Judge Sprizzio's comments on the fairness of the Diplock
courts in In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). It should be pointed out
that the European Court of Human Rights did not find fault with the legislation underlying
the Diplock courts, but with the application as practiced until August 1971. Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 2 EHRR 25, Para. 241 (1979-80).
80. See Blakesley, supra note 55; Kinneally, The Political Offense Exception: Is the United
States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty the Beginning of the End?, 2 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POV'Y 203 (1987).
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who decide on the applicability of the political offense exception consciously
favor one kind of political struggle over another, the provision nevertheless
remains a very loosely circumscribed set of terms open to radically conflict-
ing interpretations. Because the same deficiency of definition exists with
respect to terrorism, uncertainty clashes with uncertainty when terrorism
has to be located on a scale of acceptable political struggle in the context
of deciding on protection from extradition.
As a result, alternatives have been suggested to rationalize the continued
existence of the political offense exception or to bolster the fairness of
decisions in the context of a dwindling political offense exception: prose-
cuting all terrorists before an international court specializing in terrorist
crimes and creating an international criminal statute.
1. An International Court of Terrorism
Supporters and critics of the political offense exception share two fears:
that an undeserving offender might obtain the shelter of the exclusion and,
conversely, that an offender deserving of political offender status might be
extradited to a country with an unfair judicial system. This latter fear is
addressed in the suggestion that an international court of justice that has
jurisdiction over those accused of terrorist offenses be created."
According to Groarke, such an International Court of Terrorism could,
for example, be created in Europe where the danger of terrorism is pervasive.
It would operate under the auspices of the Council of Europe and would
be modelled after the European Court of Human Rights, a court that has
proven effective, not the least for its symbolism.8 2 Although the United
States might not be able to participate in such a court by dispatching its
own judges or prosecutors, it should feel more comfortable extraditing an
accused to a tribunal consisting of representatives of a variety of nations
than to a requesting state against whose regime an alleged offender has
fought. The highest possible degree of impartiality would be attained by
such a measure. At the same time, at least two more goals could be realized
by such a court: it would attract attention to the fact that nations are
cooperating to combat terrorism through nonviolent means, namely adju-
dication; and a clearer understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism and
the tolerable limits of political conflict within democratic states would
emerge.
Yet creating a court devoted to the prosecution of alleged terrorists is a
solution very much tailored to the European community and to the close
relationship the United States cultivates with it. In Europe, both the will to
81. See Groarke, supra note 22, at 1543.
82. Id. at 1542-44.
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cooperate and the procedures necessary for actual cooperation already exist.
The problem remains, however, with respect to all non-European treaty
partners with whom the United States already has or will establish extradition
treaties. It is unlikely that other nations would be able to cooperate in
similar fashion to establish international courts with jurisdiction over
terrorists 8a-not least because of widely varying state ideologies that make
the interpretation and application of the political offense exception such a
problem in the first place.
2. An International Criminal Code
The problem of differentiating between nonprotected terrorist crimes and
protected political activity could most ideally be solved within the context
of an international criminal code that sets clear substantive and procedural
standards. The UN has attempted to create a draft for such a code, but
since first undertaking the task in 1949, it has made very little progress. 4
Professor Bassiouni, however, has recently filled this void by outlining an
impressive and comprehensive model code.15 For the suppression of terror-
ism, Professor Bassiouni's code would be effective on two levels: it incor-
porates into the list of international delicts most crimes characteristic of
terrorist activity,86 and it establishes in its procedural part detailed extradition
provisions that attempt to address the dilemma of the political offense
exception.
Article VI of the Procedural Enforcement Part sketches out the extradition
provisions for the draft code.87 As Professor Bassiouni notes, this part is
particularly specific; he thereby acknowledges the important role that extra-
dition plays in the context of international cooperation and, at the same
time, the host of practical problems associated with it.88 Two clauses are
particularly noteworthy with respect to the suppression of terrorism. Section
I exempts from political offense status all crimes contained in the "Special
Part" of the Code, among them offenses typically committed by terrorists,
such as hijacking, the use of force against protected persons, and the taking
83. Such a court could be established under the auspices of the United Nations; it would,
however, be the first UN court with special jurisdiction and the first such court addressing
the claims of individuals rather than states.
84. M.C. BAssiouNI, A DRAF'r INTERNATIONAL CRMINAL CODE AND DRAFT STATUTE FOR
AN INTERNATIONAL CRnINAL TRIuUNAL 3-11 (1987) (also pointing out the UN's equally fruitless
efforts in proposing the institution of an international criminal court to the member states).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 157-62 (Aircraft Hijacking (article IX); Threat and Use of Force Against
Internationally Protected Persons (article XII); Taking of Civilian Hostages (article XIII)).
87. Id. at 193-96.
88. Id. at 195.
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of civilian hostages. 9 Section IV delineates the exceptions to extradition
that survive section I. Notably, the political offense exception has virtually
disappeared and been replaced with an amalgamation of the humanitarian
and the political protection clauses:
1.3. Extradition may be denied to a requesting Party if the requested
Party has good reason to believe that the request for extradition has
been made for purposes of prosecuting or punishing that person on
account of his race, religion, nationality, political opinion or belief, or
that that person's position may be prejudiced, or that the criminal
procedures to which he will be subjected may not be impartial, or that
he would be discriminated against for any of the above-stated reasons.-
Professor Bassiouni's approach to the political offense exception combines
two characteristics that could ensure the fairness of extradition with respect
to political offenders and yet act as a tool in the suppression of terrorism:
his Code relies on the certainty of enumerated offenses and, at the same
time, takes into account the fairness of the judicial system of the requesting
state. This approach virtually deletes the political offense exception but
safeguards the values it represents in protective clauses.
Unfortunately, Professor Bassiouni's model is plagued with practical
drawbacks similar to those in the UN's ill-fated attempts at creating an
international criminal code. Whatever the form of an international code
and whatever the date on which it could be presented for ratification, its
success rests entirely on the requirement that a substantial number of nations
become signatories. The possibility that this could happen lies, at best, far
in the future; it is at worst illusory. As Hans-Heinrich Jescheck has noted
in the context of establishing an international criminal court: "[This] would
presuppose a properly functioning system of collective security, which cannot
be achieved as long as the world situation is marked by the exigencies of
Great Power politics." 9' An international code requires a magnitude of
international cooperation that cannot be achieved at this time. An inter-
national criminal code can therefore not yet solve the very real problems
of heightened international collaboration in the face of rising terrorism.
But Professor Bassiouni's suggestions on extradition in his model Code
can fruitfully be incorporated into an alternative solution until an interna-
tional criminal code is widely ratified. Currently, in U.S. law, the political
offense exception is stripped, in the interest of combatting terrorism, of its
89. See id. at 195. In his commentary on section I, Professor Bassiouni also refers to
various conventions for an understanding of the international crimes exempted ,from the
political offense exception: the 1948 Genocide Convention (article VII); the European Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism; and the Additional Protocol Amending the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Protocol I). Id.
90. Id. at 194.
91. Jescheck, Codification: Development and Future Prospects, in M.C. BASSIouNI, ItEraR-
NATIONAL CRuNAL LAW: CRiMEs 99-100 (1986).
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original meaning and values. Professor Bassiouni's approach underscores
the point that a traditional political offense exception is dispensable in
extradition treaties as long as important safeguards, such as humanitarian
and political protection clauses, are retained. The next section explores how
the Bassiouni model can serve as a solution for bilateral United States
extradition treaties.
C. Deleting the Political Offense Exception: A Proposal
Would deleting entirely the political offense exception be a feasible
solution to the interpretational problems that have plagued the provision or
would eliminating essential values underlying the concept be too dear a
price to pay for clarity? International efforts to collaborate on suppressing
terrorism, as discussed previously, have focused on using nonviolent means
and, in particular, extradition agreements that contain the restricted political
offense exception. In limiting political offender status only to those who
attempt to bring about political change through nonviolent means, the
political offense exception in its recent form exemplifies the nonviolent,
cooperative approach that has now taken hold in the international com-
munity in the fight against terrorism. A traditional political offense exception
contradicts the international, nonviolent approach by sanctioning violence
as a means to bring about political change.
In its traditional form, the political offense exception cannot serve as a
tool in suppressing terrorism because it does not differentiate between
political activism and terrorism. Yet in its restricted, Supplementary Treaty
form, it tacitly erodes its own raison d'&re with the goal of combatting all
forms of terrorism by exempting from the exemption all violent political
activism, by sacrificing some forms of violent political struggle that the
political offense exception might originally have been meant to protect, such
as a true, yet violent political uprising, perhaps in the context of a failed
revolution directed at eliminating a ruling government. This might mean
that the political offense exception has become expendable-as long as the
values of fairness and neutrality it embodied are retained in other provisions.
Yet today, how valid are the values that underlie the original political
offense exception and that, critics claim, were essentially eroded in the
restricted political offense exception? In its original form, the political
offense exception protected all political struggle, be it violent or nonviolent.
Common violent offenses attained the protected status of a relative political
offense as long as they occurred incidental to a political uprising. At the
end of our century, this attitude has dramatically changed in the community
of democratic nations who believe in political change through the ballot
rather than the bomb.92 The European Convention on the Suppression of
92. Hearings, supra note 5, at 63.
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Terrorism categorically rejected protection of violent political struggle. Among
those nations that have promoted the steady rise of democratization and
that have, at the same time, experienced rising repulsion toward terrorist
activity, it should be inconceivable to sanction terrorist violence with the
political offense exception.
Eliminating the political offense exception would send a strong signal to
terrorists that nations will consider it their foremost duty to combat crime;
thus, supporting struggle, even democratic struggle, in other countries
becomes subordinate to that goal. Therefore, while the Supplementary
Treaty can be seen as an important step in achieving this goal, it lacks the
symbolic and deterrent impact on terrorist activity by pretending to leave
the essential nature of the political offense exception intact. Professor
Bassiouni's Criminal Code, of course, would achieve such symbolic effect,
but, as we have seen, it is unlikely that his concepts will reach the mainstream
of international law enforcement in the near future.
Unaffected by antiterrorism concerns, however, is the political offense
exception's goal of fair treatment for the accused in the requesting state.
The criminal should not receive unduly harsh treatment in the requesting
state based on his or her particular political beliefs. This consideration
applies as much to the "legitimate" political revolutionary as to the ter-
rorist-an idea very much in keeping with a fair system. In eliminating the
political offense exception, it is this particular value that has to be safe-
guarded.
Several kinds of exclusionary provisions in most extradition treaties al-
ready fulfill this function and could continue to do so. 93 For example, a
"humanitarian exception" protects all those who might suffer dispropor-
tionately from extradition. The provision in the United States' extradition
treaty with Denmark is typical:
Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances:
5. If in special circumstances, having particular regard to the age, health
or other personal conditions of the person concerned, the requested
State has reason to believe that extradition will be incompatible with
humanitarian considerations.Y
We are not seeking to negotiate treaties [of the Supplementary Treaty kind] with
nations that do not have democratic systems and that do not have fundamentally
fair judicial systems.
What we are saying here ... is that with respect to those sorts of nations,
where you have the option of the ballot box, you cannot resort to the bullet and
the bomb.
Id. (statement of Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor, Department of State).
93. A similar solution of relying predominantly on other safeguarding provisions typically
present in extradition treaties has been advocated before by Sapiro, Note, Extradition in an
Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv.
654, 700-01 (1986).
94. Extradition Treaty between the United States and Denmark, supra note 17, at 200.11.
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A similar function is fulfilled by nondiscrimination clauses. The European
Convention version prohibits extradition where
the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the request
for extradition ... has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality or
political opinion, or that that person's position may be prejudiced for
any of these reasons.95
This particular clause links the nondiscrimination clause with the "political
protection provision." The latter clause vitally protects the right to a fair
trial. It appears frequently in United States extradition treaties, often linked
to the political offense exception proper, but independently as well:
Extradition shall not be granted ... if the person whose surrender is
sought proves that the request for surrender has been made in order to
try or punish him or her for a political offense. 96
Unlike the political offense exception proper, this clause is aimed exclusively
at granting fair treatment and allows extradition where no showing is made
that the offender might be treated unfairly. (In comparison, the political
offense exception proper exempts from extradition whether or not a fair
trial is possible in the requesting country.).
Finally, protection comes from the "double criminality clause." 97 This
provision limits extraditable offenses to those "described in the Appendix
to this Treaty which are punishable under the laws of both Contracting
Parties.""8
While all of these provisions provide some assurance that an offender
will be extradited only if he can get a fair trial, the assurance is not
complete. In deleting the political offense exception, means must be sought
to ascertain the fairness of the judicial and law enforcement systems in the
requesting state. If the aim is fairness, the efforts to ascertain fairness
should be located at the origin of the extradition treaty, not in case-by-case
adjudications of the judiciary. The injustices that can occur in that instance
are shown by the case law on the IRA terrorists and the Palestinians,"
notably the Ahmad case.' °°
In Ahmad, the petitioner had argued that even if he could not be protected
under a political offense exception the court should deny his extradition to
Israel on the basis of a political protection clause. Ahmad had introduced
95. European Convention, supra note 58, art. 8(2), at 324.
96. Extradition Treaty with Italy, supra note 72, art. 5, para. 1, at 450.9.
97. This clause can only be an efficient safeguard, however, if it can be raised as a bar
to extradition during the extradition hearing itself-rather than at the trial.
98. Extradition Treaty between the United States and Germany, supra note 15, art. 2(l)(a),
at 300.7.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 39-47.




evidence that, as a PLO member accused of violence against Israelis in
West Bank territory, he would not receive a fair trial in Israel. While there
is usually a presumption of fairness in favor of the requesting country if
the State Department approves of the extradition, in this case even the State
Department's own report on human rights conditions in Israel noted that
torture and other human rights violations occurred in Israel's justice sys-
tem. 1' 1 Nevertheless, the court found that Ahmad had not made a "clear
and convincing showing" that he would be discriminated against upon
arrival in Israel.lec The underlying reason for this decision seemed to be
that the court feared it would get involved in forging foreign policy if it
were to declare Israel natio non grata with respect to extradition.
Ahmad illustrates the danger of case-by-case adjudication of circumstances
outside of the expertise of the judiciary, such as the fairness of a foreign
judicial system. 103 Instead, the requisite condition for enacting any extradi-
tion treaty should be a finding by the executive that the state with which
an extradition treaty is sought is not accused of judicial unfairness or human
rights violations. (Indeed, one has to wonder why the United States-quite
apart from any considerations with respect to the political offense excep-
tion-would want to enter into extradition treaties with any countries
accused of human rights violations.). 104
An acceptable standard for fairness is not hard to find: it should be
measured against the principles embraced by such organizations as Amnesty
International or the Helsinki Reports on Human Rights. Under this stan-
dard, 34 of the current 104 extradition treaties to which the U.S. is a
signatory would today no longer be defensible. 05 Amnesty International's
101. Id. at 415-16.
102. Id. at 416.
103. While initial decisions on extradition are made by the executive branch, courts, through
the procedural device of writ of habeas corpus, control the fair execution of extradition
decisions. For a description of the process and an analysis of "due process" limitations placed
on denials or grants of extradition, see Wellington, Extradition: A Fair and Effective Weapon
in the War on Terrorism, 51 Oio ST. L.J. 1447 (1990). Wellington suggests that judicial
evaluation of foreign judicial and executory systems be handled in a "diplomatic and prudent
fashion so as to preserve fairness" and to ensure preservation of friendly relations with the
requesting state. Id. at 1455 n.59. Common sense would suggest that, in general, the executive
branch would be in a position more suited to judging foreign systems on a regular and timely
basis, and have better access to resources, than the judiciary.
104. This approach is in keeping with the increased role that individual human rights law
has played in the adjudication of extradition issues in federal courts. See generally Quigley,
The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & Com. REG. 401 (1990).
105. The following 32 countries with whom the U.S. has extradition treaties are mentioned
in Amnesty International's Report on countries that have exercised some kind of torture on
prisoners in the recent past: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Congo, Egypt,
El Salvador, Ghana, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Lesotho,
Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam,
Turkey, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zambia. AmNEsTy INTmNATiONAL, TORTURE IN TE Eioxrms:
AN AmNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT (1984).
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findings could be supplemented with the United States' own findings em-
bodied in the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices that are collected
for those countries receiving United States aid and for all member states of
the UN.J06 Such a prerequisite for extradition treaties would avoid not only
seemingly unjust decisions on extradition, but also results of cases such as
Ahmad. Particularized findings, rather than, for example, "blank extradi-
tion checks" to democratically governed states, are also imperative in light
of the fact that democracy does not by definition, or in practice, mean that
methods applied in the judiciary and executive process are necessarily fair.'07
A system of protective clauses and prerequisite findings on the fairness
of the requesting state's judicial system benefits in equal measure offenders
accused of pure and of relative political crimes-an important consideration,
since deleting entirely the political offense exception actually affects both
the treatment of pure and relative political offenses. The system's safety
for pure political offenses can be tested against a controversial provision in
the German Criminal Code,10 section 129a, which prohibits participation
in organizations formed in order to plan or commit terrorist attacks.1 9
Were Germany to request extradition of a would-be terrorist from the
United States, one clause preventing such extradition would be the double
criminality clause. Under American constitutional law, participation in a
group advocating the overthrow of the government or other violent change
106. See, for example, CouNTRY REPoRTs ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990: REPORT
SUmrrED TO THE CoMMIrraE ON FoREiGN RELTixoNs U.S. SENATE AND Tim COmMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FEB. 1991.
107. For example, Amnesty International reported for a date as late as October 1989 that
detention without charge of peace activists and others was possible in Czechoslovakia and East
Germany. "Amnesty Says Violations Persist Despite East Bloc Improvements," Reuter Library
Report, Oct. 24, 1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file). The detention methods in (West)
German prisons-complete isolation for example-have also been cited as inhuman. Id.
108. See Schueler, Strafverfolgung ohne Tat: Der Paragraph 129a: ein Anschlag auf den
Rechtsstaat, Die Zeit, Nov. 16, 1990, at 17, col. 1. See also Baker's discussion of this section
and its repercussions for the Rechtsstaat. Baker, The Western European Legal Response to
Terrorism, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1, 20-21 (1987).
109. Bildung terroristischer Vereinigungen
(1) Wer eine Vereinigung griindet, deren Zweck oder deren Tditigkeit darauf
gerichtet sind,
1. Mord, Totschlag oder V6lkermord ...
2. Straftaten gegen die pers6nliche Freiheit ... zu begehen, oder wer sich an
einer solchen Vereinigung als Mitglied beteiligt, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe von einem
Jahr bis zu zehn Jahren bestraft.
German Criminal Code (StGB) § 129(a):
Formation of a Terrorist Association:
(1) Whoever founds an association whose goal or activity is directed at
1. murder, manslaughter or genocide...
2. crimes against the personal freedom [or any other commonly dangerous crimes]
or whoever participates-in such an association as a member shall be punished by
a sentence of one year to ten years.
Even an attempt to commit this felony is punishable under § 23(l).
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is not punishable, unless the participant's aim is to incite "imminent lawless
action" and his activity is "likely to incite or produce such action." 110 In
addition, the absence of the felony "Membership in a Terrorist Organiza-
tion" in the list of enumerated offenses for which extradition is mandatory
protects the offender. Lastly, a political protection clause would prevent
extradition in this situation, although in general the justice system of the
Federal Republic is regarded as fair.
CONCLUSION
The political offense exception is marred by the tension between its values
of political self-determination and the discomfort in applying its protection
to acts committed by terrorists. Taking also into consideration the need for
strong cooperation between nations in light of increasing terrorist violence,
this Note suggests that the political offense exception, both in its traditional
and in its restricted Supplementary Treaty version, has outlived its time. In
its stead, a system of safeguards should become mandatory to ensure that
offenders will receive a fair trial if extradited. Such a system, and any
extradition treaty per se, should be based on regular executive findings
evaluating the general fairness of the judicial system of a requesting country.
110. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). This case would still protect the German
would-be terrorist, because Brandenburg does not take into account the seriousness of the act
advocated.
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